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In the Supreme Court
of the_ State of Utah
STATE OF CT AH~ by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,

Plaintiff and Appellant~
VS~

]. HOWARD VALENTINE and
FLORENCE S.VALENTI~F~
Defendants,

Case No~
9100

WESTERN STATES REFINING COMPAl'\Y, a Corporation,
Intetv(::ning Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT 0 F THE CASE
The intervenor admits that the plaintiffs statement of the
case is substantially correct. However, exception is taken to
the second paragraph of the statement) wherein the plain tiff
alleges that the court granted plaintiff immediate occupancy
of the premises. This V/as not the fact or the case. The order
shows that the plaintiff was given the right to occupy the

3
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premises \~· henev er the Iand

V/

as

needed fo c construction

( R. 9) . The occupancy by the plaintiff did not take place
Wl til three years and three month after the signing of the order
of occupancy.

STATEAfENT OF FACTS
The intervenor admits that the plaintiff's statement of
facts is subs tan tially correct, except as to the £ollo~vin g particulars.
lvlr. Valentine, one of the defendants, was in court in the
capacity of a party de£ endant and not in any other capacity
w hatsoevcr.

Mr. Wagstaff \Vas in court in the capacity of a practicing
a ttoi n ey .and one of the defendants' counsels~ and not in any

other capacity whatsoever.
Plaintiff~s

comment in its statement of facts, that Mr.

Valentine and Mr. Wagstaff, nboth

being present in court and

both agreed [() the order of the court~ not on Iy by silence and

acq uicscence ~ but by constructive and actl ve participation therein~'' is a rgum en tive, improper, an incorrect statement of the

facts, and a conclusion of the plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE. The intervenor is not bound by the order
of occupancy under the provisions of the -due process of 1aw
clause of the Constitution of Utah.

4
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POINT TWO. 1'he intervenor was entitled to intervene
into the action as a matter of right, and the trial court did not
err in permitting the ~ntervention.
POINT THREE. The intervenor is not bound by any order
or proceeding 1n tb e action made prior to the date of interveotion~

POINT FOUR. The value of intervcnorts leasehold interest is fixed as of the date of the order allo,ving intervention.
POINT FIVE.

Plaintiff had actual notice of the lease

between the de£ enda.n ts and the intervenor~

POINT SIX. Plaintiff, by its conduct, is barred from pleading equitable estoppel.

POINT SEVEN. The intervenor is entitled to just compensation for its lea5ehold interest in the property condemned.
EIGHT~

There is sufficient evidence upon which
the trial court based j t s judgm en t ~ and as a m.a tter of Iaw the
judgment should be affirmed.
POINT

ARGUMENT

POINT ONE
THE IKTERVENOR IS t\OT BOUND BY THE ORDER

OF OCCUPANCY UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
DUE PROCESS OF LAW CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUa
TJON OF UTAH.
It is undisputed and admitted that the_intcrvenor was not
served with process in the condemnation proceedings and that
5
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s urn mons was not issued or served naming the Western States
Refining Company as a patt}T to the action. The record further.
shows that no service of process was made by publication or

other constructive service methods .
The Constitution of Utah provides:

nNo person shaH be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of

law.'~

Constitution of (; tah
Art~ I, Sec. 7
The Supre1ne Court of Utah ruled in the case of Parry
v~

Bonneville Irr. Dist., 0.71 G. 202, 263

P~

751:

·~It

is of course an elementary rule of law that there
can be no judicial action affecting vested rights that is
not based upon some process or notice where by the
interested parties are brought \Vithin the jurisdiction
of the judicial tribunal about to render judgment.~'
The Rul cs of Civil Procedure set £orth how an action ~rill

be commenced and when th c court obtains

jurisdiction~

Rule 3,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states :
~~Commencement

of Action. (a) Ho,v commenced.
A civil action is commenced ( l ) by filing a complaint
with the court~ or ( 2) by service of a summons. * * *
(c) Time of Jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of £ling the com plaint or service
of summons."
Rule 10 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:

* * * in the complaint the titJc of the action shall
include the names of all the parties~ * * * ,,
't

The com plaint in this action does not name the Western

6
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States

Refining

Company~ the inter"enor.,

as a party to the

action (R. 1) ~
The plain tiff now states that the intervenor is bound as

a party to the action because of the presence of some of the
officers of the intervenor in the courtroom at the time of the
hearing on the order o£ immediate occupancy.

228~

Telford~

The Court stated in the case of State v.
72 P.2d 626:

93 U.

tThe re are many cases where courts have juris diction
of a subject matter but that jurisdiction must be in·
voked a ceo rding to a certain procedure. In invoking
the jurisdiction of the district court on matters wherein
it has original jurisdiction~ it requires a com plaint, petition, or application. One cannot invoke the jurisdiction
by simply stating orally onets complaint.~~
t

The Utah court in the case of Naisbitt v Herrick, 76 U ~
+

575, 290 P+ 950, ruled:
HDue process of law requires that before one can be
bound by a judgment affecting his property right, some
process must be served upon him which in some degree
at Ieast is calculated to give him notice. ~ (Timphasis
j

ours.)
The record sho·ws that not only was summon5 not served
upon the intervenor, but that the intervenor ~Tas not named
as a party to the action in the complaint. The Second Judicial
District Court in .and for Davis County~ Utah, did not have
jwisdiction over the Western States Refining Company, the
intervenor~ until December 13 ~ 19 5 S~ and any orders, decrees~
rulings or judgments made prior to that date were a nullity
as to the Western States Refining Company.
7
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POINT TWO
'fHE INTERVENOR WAS ENTJTLFD TO INTER.
\ El\E ll'\TO TilE ACTION AS A lviATTER Of RIGHT~
AND THE TRll\.L COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMIT·
TIKG THE INTERVENTION.
1

The plaintin asserts in the :fir.st pojnt of its brief that the
court erred in aJlov..'ing the Western States Refining Company
to in t erv en e in this action. In making such an assertion, the
Road Commission disregards the legislative enactments of
the Utah L egi sl atu re) ~rhich passed a Ia w setting forth who is
entitled to .int erven c as a party to a condem nation suit.
· (tWho tna y appear and defend.~All persons in occu·
patio n of or having or cta.irn ing an interest in~ any of
the property des.cr ibed in the cotn p1a1n t, or in the
damages for the taking thereof, though not named,
tna y appear~ plead and defend, each in res pcct to his
own property or intere-St, or that claimed by bitn~ in
the ~arne rnanner as if named i_n the complaint~~

78-34-7, Utah Code Annotatedl 1953
The position taken by the state~ relating to the right of the
intervenor to in te rv ene and pro teet i t5 property rights, is
incomprehensible in '=it\\' of the provisions of the statute just
quoted.

PO ll\'1' T'HREE

THE INTERVENOR IS NOT BOUND BY A:t\Y ORDER
OR PROCEEDING l N THE ACTION MADE PRIOR TO

THE DATE OF INTERVENTION.
8
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The plain tiff asserts in the first point of its br lef that the
intenenor is bowtd by the order of occupancy made by the
court on the 29th day of August, 195 2 (R. 9) . The record
shows that the Western States Refining Company did not
become a party to the action until the 13th day of December,
1955 (R. 13).

Under no stretch of the due process clause of the Con~
stitution or of the imagination could the intervenor be said
to have been a party to the action at the time of the hearing
on the order of occupancy. The mere fact that the president of
the intervenor) Mr. W. S. Wagstaff, was in the courtroom
does not make the corporation a party to the action. At that
time Mr . Wagstaff was a practicing attorney~at-law and a
member of the bar of this state. His being made counsel of
record for the defendants (the Valentines)) cannot be said
to be an act which would give the court jurisdiction over the
corporation.
The plain tiff asserts that the corporation received benefits
from the order of occupancy .and therefore it is estopped from
claiming any damages from the taking of the land~
The defendants could not bind the intervenor by any
representations or stipulations that they chose to make. Insofar
as the order of occupancy is concerned, it was a mere io terlorutory order~ State v. Danielson! 122 U. 220, 247 P.2d 900~
and the defendants, or the intervenor after it came into the .
action, had it been affected by the order, could attack the
order and the grounds for its issuance. Utah Copper Co. v.
Montana Bingham Consol. Mining Co., 69 Ur 423, 255 P. 672r

.9
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After reviewing the record, there are serious doubts that,·
if con tested, th c courtj s order allowing occupancy would have
been sustained. The State's O\v n \Vi tness testified in August,
1952, at th~ hearing on Immediate Occupancy:
J.\.Ir. Health: ~· * * * \X'e noted che activity on this·
land and the main reason for asking for the order of
im1nediatc occupancy is we didn't \V ant to enhance the
value the state would have to buy in the future by
buying out a business 7' ~
R~39~ Tr. 0. 0~., p~ge 7
The record continues:
Mr. lvcrson: t~Isn~t this the case, L\lr. Heath, the only
reason this order of oc<.:upancy is asked for is because
the defend ants here have been imp roving the property
and have gone ahead with the use of it?"
Mr. Heath: n ..fhat is the main reason."

R· 39~ Tr . 0. 0.~ page 9
The court granted the order of immediate occupancy~ but
carefully granted the defendants the right to use the land and
occupy it until the state needed the land fo'r the road (R. 39,

page 20, 21). The court by direct implication recog~
nized that the State did not need the land at that time nor
v..Tould it neecl it for some time to come, but entered the order
so that it ·would be unnecessary for the parties to come back
.at a later time.

Tr. 0.

0.~

\X1 hi le it is discretionary Vt~"i th the court to grant an order
of immediate occupancy, there should be a showing of the necessity. for a speedy occupation of· the land. Utah Copper Co.
v. lvlontana Bingham Consol. J\1in. Co., 69 U. 423~ 255 P. 672~
It is cl cJ. r from the record that there was no necessity for an
10
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immediate occupation of the property. The plaintiff alleges
that the intervenor acquired benefits by this order. What
benefits?

POINT FOUR
THE VALUE OF It\TERVENORtS LEASEHOLD IN-

TEREST IS FIXED AS OF THE DATE OF THE ORDER
ALLOWING INTERVENTION.
The p1ain tiff asserts in the third and sixth points of its
brief that the value of the leasehold interest is fixed as of the

date of the summons.
The in terv en or admits that this is correct and is the statu-

tory law~ insofar as it pertains to those upon whom the summons is served.
Tb e 1aw of this State is clear and definite that a party
having an interest in land being condemned) but who is not
a party to the suit) is not bound by that summons and that the
value of the interest taken i-s fixed as of the date of the intervention of that party into the action4
The plain tiff~ State of ·utah J has the burden and the duty
of bringing in eath and every party it seeks to bind by the
condemnation suit, and the rights of those who are ignored
and who are not brought in as proper parties to the action
cannot be bound by any orders or decrees rendered by the
court in the matter. This has been cone1usi vely sett1ed in the
cases of Oregon S. L. & l7. N. Ry+ Co. v. Mitchell~ 7 U. S 10~
27 P+ 693, and Ogden L. & L Ry~ Co. v~ Jones) 51 U. 62~ 168

P. 548. In the latter case the Utah Court said:
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Fit is also admitted that v.~here a summons is not
served, the time at which the value of the land and
the damages must be determined under our statute i~
the date on VoJThich the landowner enters his appearance
in the action. ~
t

The Supreme Court of LTtah ruJcd in the case of Brigham

City v.

Chase~ 3? 1!~ 410, 85 P. 436:

... Where such persons are not all named as parties
or not served, the judgment of condemnation will
simply be a nulJity as to those o1nitte(L"
ln the B r~gha1n City case, the court goes on to say that the
condemnors 't proceeds at their peril~~ where they have not
named all the parties to the action or served them with process+
As the \\-'estern St~tes Refining Company did not become
a party to the action until December 13~ 1955 (R. 13)! as

a matter of la\v damages must be assessed as of that date.

POINT FIVE
.PLAINTIFF HAD ACTIIAL NOTJCE.OF THE LEASE
BErwrEEN THE DE.FEJ:\'DANTS AKD THE INTERVENOR.

In point three of pJ.aintifr s brief, it alleges that it was
the duty of the intervenor to come into the action, as it had
actual notice of the proceedings. This argument is diametrically
opposed to the theory adopted in point one of its brieC 'vherein
it asslerts. that the intervenor should not have been permitted
to come .into the case at alL

As the State of Utah commenced the

action~

it "vas its
duty to bring in all the parties it sought to bind by the pro12
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ceedings. The intervenor was under no 1egal duty to come into
the case at all.
The plaintiff had actual notice of the existence .of the
lease at the time of the hearing on the order of occupancy~
by the te~timony of Mr. \-'a]entinc, 'vho nqt only stated that
there was a lease, but gave its terms and conditions (R. 39,

TL 0. 0., page 12). The State recei:ved a land appraisal (Intervenor's Exhibit No~ 1) filed by Mr. Werner Keipe~ ·~·hich
set forth in detail the ex.is tenc e of the lease. The ques ti ort
that the plain till Ieaves u nan sw c red in its bric f is: Why did
not the State of Utah bring in the intervenor as a proper
party to the· action in 1952 after it had actual notice of the
existence of the lease bet~veen the \'?estern States Refining

Company and the

defendants~

Valentines ?

. . The plain tiff had further notice of the lease by the fact
t~at the intervenor \\··as in P?ssession of the property

from

the early part of August, 1952, up to the time that the ~tate

took possession in December, 19 55.
Possession is actual notice of an interest in the title to
land. Meagh~r v. Dean~ 97 U. 173, 91 P.2d 454; Toland V~
Corey, 6 ·u_. 392~ 24 P.190 (affirmed by the United States

Supreme Court, 154 U+ S. 499~ 38 L.EJr 1062, 14 S. Ct. 1144).
In this latter case, the Utah Court said:
"\Xre think the better doctrine is that an occupant's
possession is actual notice of. ~i~ ti tJ c, and all persons
with notice of such possession rnust at their peril take
notice .of his fu 11 ti tJ e in the premises, no difference
what the record shows.''

Utah law does not require that a] J [eases be put on record,
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and it is a well recognized fact in the business world that the
vast rna jo ri ty of leases executed are not placed on record.
Plain tiff asserts that the 1ease was a mere executory 1ease.
This is not the case~ and the record so shows that this was an
executed and delivered lease~
The Iease had been executed by the parties on April 10,
1952 (Tr. Trans. dated November 7~ 1956~ page 23, Defs
Exhibit No. 1, Lease). The lessors, Valentines, the defendants,
had bound themselves. to build a gasoline station according
to the plans and specifi.cations attached to the lease, and they
had in fact substantially completed the station prior to the
hearing on the order of occupancy. Plaintiff admits this in
its brief in its £ourth point. Both parties were bound by the
lease and neither party could breach the lease without the
incur renee o £ a legal liability. The on!y thing that ~·as
executory about the lease wa.s the exact date upon which the
rental commenced to run. The term of the lease had already
commenced to run prior to the hearing on the order of occu·

pancy.
Plain tiff makes the observation that the plans and speci-

:fications were not attached to the 1ease~ and, by innuendo,
attempts to cast some doubt upon the lease. The record shows
that no demand for the plans and specifications was ever made

by the plaintiff, and had such a demand been made the plans
would have been produced.
The plaintiff a.ll eges that not only \Vas the Iease executory,
but that the intervenor did not have a vested right in the property. This is not the fact nor the law . In the case of Ewert

14
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v.. Robinson, -CCA 8th ( 1923), 289 F~ 740~ 35 A~L.R. 219).
the Circuit Court said:
nit is no longer necessary to go upon land, as in the
Jays of old and receive a t"tvig or a t:lod of dirt as a
token of changed possession. The delivery of the deed
or lease accomplishes the same thing, and in a much · ·
less cumbersotne manner~·~
. Warvelle, in his work on Ejectment, Sec. 156; states:

nAn estate for years is both created and perfected by
· the execution and delivery of a lease for the term~ and
such lease~ 'vhlle it confers no rights of ownership)
does c~rry a right to the possession and pro.fi ts of the
land.)!
I

Where a lease has been ex€cuted \Vit~ authority and it is
prima facie tbe act of the pa~ties~ it is entitled to introduc~or:_..
to show the right to possession of the land. Tarpey v. Dcseret
Salt Co., S U.

205~

14 P+ 338.

The plain tiff cites a n u1nber of ca sc s d cfin in g cxecu tory
interests, but it is to be ·noted in rea ding the cases that they
all pertain to buy-sell agreements dealing \vith personal prop~
erty~ to wit: stoves, barrel stave5, cotton~ wagons and buggies~
and baled hay.
·

POINT SIX
_PLAINTIFF, RY ITS CONDIJCT, IS BARRED FROM

PLEADING EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
Plaintiff, throughout its brief, seeks to interject equitable
reliefs· a. gains t the intervenor by pleading cstoppel.· The w riter.s
of this brief believe that it is unnecessary to cite authority for
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the nclean hands doctrine't of equity which requires one who
seeks equity to do equity_.
The evidence sho\vs that the State of Utah, until the time
that the defendants, pursuant to the terms of the lease~ commenced to construct the service station, had no intention of
condemning any land in the vicinity of the property in question.

Mr. Heath) right·Of-way engineer for the state, testi£ ed
that the only reason the state took the land was that the
defendants had started to build improvements on their property!
and the state did not want any landowners to enhance the
value of their land (R. 39, Tr. 0. 0.~ pages 7~ 8, 9). He further
testified that the state had not condemned any other land and
that the state would negotiate w lth all other landowners before
filing suit (R. 39, TrT Or 0., page 8).
The conduct of the State of LTtah throughout the entire
1aw suit has been such that it cannot now plead the defense of
equity.

POINT SEVEN
THE INTERVENOR IS ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION FOR ITS LEASEHOLD INTEREST IN THe
PROPERTY

CONDEMNED~

The State of Utah Road Commission has attempted to

seize and take the interest of the Intervenor without just
compensation in violation of the Constitution of the United
States and Constitution of Utah.
The United States Supreme Court~ in the case of U. S.
v. General Motors

Corp., 323 U.

S~

373, 65

S~

Ct. 357, 89 L.
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Ed." 311) 156 A.L.R~ 390, after ruling that the taking of property
without just compensation is violative of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, stated:
"When it (U. S. Government) takes the property~
that is) the fee~ the lease~ whatever he may own, ter·
minating altogether his interest, under the established
law it must pay him for Vv~hat is taken * * * ."'
The Constitution of the State of l}tah states:
~~Private

property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use Vl ithou t just com pen sa tion.''

Art.

1~

Sec. 22t
Constitution of Utah
To deny the intervenor just cotnpensa tion for the value of

its ·leasehold interest

v.~ould

be to violate all of the constitu-

tional sa£ eguards tha ~ our forefathers sccured for us in the

Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah.

The California court reccntlyJ in the case of Charlestrom
v. Lyon Van and Storage Company ( 1957) ~ 313 P~2d 645~
rejected an attempt to deny a leas eho 1der compensation for its
leasehold interest. In that case~ the lcssorJ knov{ing of the impef,ldin g condemnation~ served the 1e.ssee v{i t h notice of te rmination for alleged violations of the lease, so that he could
claim all of the damages "i;Vhich v..·ere to be a\varded for himself.
Tbe court rejected this scheme and v.ren t on to say:
~ ~ 0 r dina ril y Vl h c n

the gover nm en t condemns 1eased
property thereby taking title to the ~·hole property in
fee the lease is obliterated, and, in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary~ the parties to the Jease are
each entitled to compensation for the taking of their
respective rights.
t t
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POINT EIGHT
THERE IS Sl~FFIQENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS JUDG.t\{ENT, AND AS
A MATTER OF LAW THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
AFfiRMED.
~~It is recommended that the State Road Commission
make sure 1n its settlement 'vith tbe present o~vners~

that satisfactory settlement is also made with the ten·

ant.'J

I nterveno rt s Exhibit No. 1
Report of Werner Keipe

The above quotation is fro1n the appralsal report of Mr.
Kcipe. At the time the statement was made by Mr. Keipe, he
was employed by the plaintiff to make an appraisal of the
land ln question for the pi ain tiff. The State now seeks to sh01\'
that Mr Keipc placed no value upon the leasehold interest.
r

The entire hypothesis upon which the State relies to show
that the leasehold in tc rest had no value is based upon the
thea ry of ~v·h at would a buyer give for land knowing that it
was about to be condemned~

The method of computing compensation generally in
condemnation suits is the "fair market value" of the land or
the leasehold taken.
The court) in the recent case of V ronti k is Brothers vs.
State, -~r· U. 2d ____ , ____ P .2d ____ , observed:

* * * The accepted formula for determining fair
market value rs * * * .;vhat would a purchaser wj lling
n
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to buy but not required to do so, pay and what \vould
a se Her \\' illi ng to se11 but not required to do so ask.' .

By adding the condition of nknowledge of impending
condemnationJ~

a fair 1narket value could not be arrived at. Mr.

Keipe's entire testimony of the leasehold interest having no
value was predicated upon the assumption that the land would
be condemned in the immediate future (Tr. Trans. dated
March 11~ 1959 (pages 8, 9, 10). When Mr. Kcipe~ on cross
examination~ removed the hypothesis of impending condemnation) he a.rrlved at a value of the leasehold~ based upon the
statlon~s sale of gasoline during 1953, 1954 and 1955, under
one theory of computation, of $6~000.00 (Tr. Trans. dated
March 11, 1959l page 17) and under another theory of com·
putation, of $23,325.00 (Tr. Trans. dated March 11, 1959,

page 19) ~
The record contains substantial evidence of the market
value of the leasehold interest which l'uns from $6~000. 00

(Tr.

Trans~

dated March 11, 1959, page 17) to $40,000.00
(Tr. Trans~ dated February 4, 1959) page 11).

4-.The measure of damages for leasehoJd interest
taken under eminent domain has been decJared generally to be the fair market value of the leasehold or
unexpired term of the lease.,,
3 A~L.R. 2d 290
Annotator's comment~ citing cases
In determining the ·value of the Jeasehold interest~ it is

not always an easy thing to ascertain \Vith exactness what the
ufair market valuet' is.
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Hleaseholds are not ordinarily the subject of sale on
the market, and vary so much in the length of terrn 1
rent, and other particulars, including the nature of the
pro pcrty J etnis ed, and its particular use by tbe 1essee,
that appJying tnarket value as the criterion for determining the vaJ ue of the leas eho1d rna y~ in some a rL
cumstances:t be impossi blc or might produce inequitable
results+')
Ed. . S
ttona1 ummary
3 A.L.R. 2d 289
In line with this reasoning, the intervenor introduced

additionaJ evidence other than that of the value of the leasehal d interest based on the fair market vaJ ue. This evidence
\vas to the profits that the leased property made during the
period of time of the opera. tion of the b uslness from 19 52
up to the time of the taking .ln December, 195 5.
4

~where

it appears that the property condemned is
of sut.:h a nature that the profits derived from its use
are the entire or chief source of its value, evidence of
the amount of the profits is to be considered in deter~
mining the market value.~,.

Annotator's comment, 7
Gting cases

A.L~R. 171,

Considering the profits of the business and the resulting
loss of pro£ ts from the taking as the means of determining
market value, the evidence shows a value up to $68) 720.00
(Tr. Trans. dated March 11~ 1959, page 42)
+

The Supreme Court of the ljnited States., in the case of
C. S. v. Genelal Motors Corp., cited previously~ stated;
~ . In

the ordinary case, for \\'ant of a better standard,
market value~ so called, is the criterion of that value.
In some cases this criterion cannot be used either because
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the interest condemned has no market value or because"
in the circun1stances., market value furnishes an inaE~
proprlate measure of actual value.·:>
The intervenor furnished the court with substantial evidence of the value of the leasehold interest~ based on market
value and the loss of profits resulting from the taking. The
oourfs judgment awarding na just compensation" in compliance with the Constitution and based upon the evidence
was correct, and as a matter of law, the judgment should be

affirmed.

,
SUMMARY

Intervenor is entitled to ~·just compensation'' for the taking

of its leasehold interest on the property condemned by the

plaintiff and the trial court's judgment should be

affirmed~

Respectfully submitted,
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES
Attorney,r for Inter~·enor
and Respondent
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